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Our goal in this project is to gain a better empirical understanding of the interna-
tional ﬁnancial implications of currency movements. To this end, we construct a data-
base of international currency exposures for a large panel of countries over 1990-2004.
We show that trade-weighted exchange rate indices are insu!cient to understand the
ﬁnancial impact of currency movements. We show that our currency measure has high
explanatory power for the valuation term in net foreign asset dynamics: exchange rate
valuation shocks are sizable, not quickly reversed and may entail substantial wealth
redistributions. Further, we demonstrate that many developing countries hold short
foreign-currency positions, leaving them open to negative valuation eects when the
domestic currency depreciates. However, we also show that many of these countries
have substantially reduced their foreign currency exposure over the last decade.
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It has been shown that the foreign liabilities of the United States are mostly denominated in 
dollars whereas there is a substantial non-dollar component in its foreign assets. Accordingly, 
unanticipated dollar depreciation improves the net international investment position of the United 
States by increasing the dollar value of its foreign assets relative to its foreign liabilities. In contrast, 
many emerging countries have historically issued significant amounts of foreign-currency debt. 
Remarkably little is known about the currency composition of foreign assets and liabilities of most 
countries. A major contribution of our project is to address this data deficit by building an empirical 
profile of the international currency exposure of a large number of countries. We then exploit the 
estimated currency positions to create financially-weighted exchange rate indices (instead of trade-
weighted) and capture the valuation impact of currency movements on net foreign asset positions. We 
show that trade-weighted exchange rate indices are insufficient to understand the financial impact of 
currency movements. Our financially-weighted indices have high explanatory power for the valuation 
term in net foreign asset dynamics: exchange rate valuation shocks are sizeable, not quickly reversed 
and may entail substantial wealth redistributions. Many developing countries hold short foreign-
currency positions, leaving them open to negative valuation effects when the domestic currency 
depreciates. However, we also show that many of these countries have substantially reduced their 
foreign currency exposure over the last decade. Shifts to equity-type liabilities and large increases in 
reserves play a more important role than changes in the currency denomination of external debt. 
 Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung 
 
Es ist früher gezeigt worden, dass die Auslandsverbindlichkeiten der USA meist in Dollar 
denominiert sind während ihre Auslandsaktiva zu einem erheblichen Teil aus Anlagen in anderen 
Währungen bestehen. Dementsprechend verbessert eine unvorhergesehene Dollarabwertung die 
Auslandsposition der USA, wenn man in Dollar rechnet. Im Gegensatz dazu haben sich viele 
Entwicklungsländer in der Vergangenheit in hohem Umfang in Fremdwährung verschuldet. Für viele 
Länder ist erstaunlich wenig darüber bekannt, in welchen Währungen ihre Auslandsforderungen und 
Verbindlichkeiten denominiert sind. Ein wichtiger Beitrag unseres Projektes besteht darin, dieses 
Defizit zu beseitigen, indem wir für eine große Zahl von Ländern ein Profil ihrer 
Währungszusammensetzung erstellen. Diese Schätzungen verwenden wir dann um „finanzgewichtete“ 
Indizes (statt handelsgewichtete) zu erstellen und so die Bewertungseffekte von 
Wechselkursbewegungen auf die Nettowährungspositionen eines Landes zu ermitteln. Wir zeigen, 
dass handelsgewichtete Indizes die Effekte von Wechselkursveränderungen nur ungenügend 
widergeben. Unsere finanzgewichtete Indizes haben einen hohen Erklärungswert für die Dynamik der 
Nettoauslandsposition: die Bewertungseffekte von Wechselkursschocks sind beachtlich, sie kehren 
sich nicht schnell um und können die Vermögenspositionen zwischen den Ländern erheblich 
verschieben. Viele Entwicklungsländer sind per Saldo in fremder Währung verschuldet, was sie 
verletzlich macht, wenn ihre Währung abwertet. Wir zeigen aber auch, dass viele dieser Länder in der 
letzten Dekade ihre Verschuldung in Auslandswährung deutlich verringert haben. Dabei spielen 
Verschiebungen zu aktienähnlichen Verschuldungsarten und der Aufbau von Währungsreserven eine 
wichtigere Rolle als Veränderungen in der Währungszusammensetzung ihrer Auslandsverschuldung 
selbst.  1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A recent wave of research has emphasized that exchange rate movements operate through
a valuation channel, in addition to their traditional impact on real variables such as the
trade balance. The valuation channel refers to the impact of capital gains and losses on
the international balance sheet. While such valuation eects have always been present,
their quantitative signiﬁcance has grown in recent years in line with the rapid growth in
the scale of cross-border ﬁnancial holdings (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2007a). Since cur-
rency movements are an important contributor to capital gains and losses on foreign assets
and liabilities, the goal of our project is to gain a better empirical understanding of the
international ﬁnancial impact of shifts in exchange rates.1
This eect varies across countries based on the scale of the international balance sheet,
the net value of the position and the currency composition of foreign assets and liabilities.
For instance, authors such as Tille (2003), Gourinchas and Rey (2007a, 2007b) and Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2005, 2007b) have highlighted that the foreign liabilities of the United States
are mostly denominated in dollars while there is a substantial non-dollar component in its
foreign assets. Accordingly, unanticipated dollar depreciation improves the net international
investment position of the United States by increasing the dollar value of its foreign assets
relative to its foreign liabilities. In contrast, many emerging markets have historically issued
signiﬁcant amounts of foreign-currency debt — for these countries, an extensive literature
has highlighted that currency depreciation has induced adverse balance sheet eects.2
Remarkably little is known about the currency composition of the foreign assets and lia-
bilities of most countries: a major contribution of our project is to address this data deﬁcit
by building an empirical proﬁle of the international currency exposures of a large number of
countries. We then exploit the estimated currency positions to create ﬁnancially-weighted
exchange rate indices, while the interaction of the ﬁnancial exchange rate indices and the
gross scale of the international balance sheet allows us to capture the valuation impact of
currency movements on net foreign asset positions. In addition, the currency exposure data
may be useful in evaluating the new wave of global macroeconomic models that endogenize
the composition of international portfolios and analyzing the ‘wealth’ channel of monetary
policy in open economies. Accordingly, the analysis of currency exposure data may pro-
vide new insights on the interaction between ﬁnancial globalization and macroeconomic
behavior.
Our analysis yields three important ﬁndings. First, we compare asset- and liability-
weighted exchange rate indices to the conventional trade-weighted exchange rate index.
While we ﬁnd that there are on average high correlations across the indices, we also high-
light that these indices can diverge in important ways. This is especially true for the
liability-weighted index, in view of the importance of domestic-currency liabilities which
are extensive for advanced economies and growing rapidly for developing and emerging
economies.
Second, we combine the asset- and liability-weighted indices to create a net ﬁnancial
1Gourinchas and Rey (2007a, 2007b) and Tille (2003) have made studies of the valuation channel for the
United States, while Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) have examined valuation eects
for a large panel of countries in a variety of settings.
2See the contributions to Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005) and Devereux, Lane and Xu (2006).
1index that attaches a positive weight to currencies in which a country holds a long position
and a negative weight to currencies in which it is short. Accordingly, the net ﬁnancial index
captures the directional exposure of a country’s international balance sheet to exchange rate
movements. We ﬁnd that there is tremendous heterogeneity in the comovement between
the trade-weighted index and the net ﬁnancial index. While 20 percent of countries have a
strong positive correlation (above 0=7) most countries (63 percent) show a negative corre-
lation: for these countries, depreciation of the trade-weighted index may boost net exports
but is associated with a decline in the net ﬁnancial index that damages the external bal-
ance sheet through a negative valuation eect. Moreover, we quantify the scale of these
currency-induced valuation shocks and ﬁnd that these shocks can be substantial, are not
quickly reversed and explain a signiﬁcant fraction of aggregate valuation shocks, especially
for developing countries.
Third, we construct a summary measure of aggregate foreign currency exposure that
captures the sensitivity of the external balance sheet to a uniform exchange rate movement
against all foreign currencies. We ﬁnd that the majority of countries have a net negative
exposure, where they have more foreign currency liabilities than foreign currency assets.
These net negative positions are quite large in many cases and leave countries exposed to
substantial valuation losses in the event of a uniform depreciation. However, we also ﬁnd
that, over the last decade, many countries have shifted their exposure to foreign currencies
in a positive direction, with a shift to equity-type liabilities and large increases in reserves
playing a more important role than any change in the currency denomination of external
debt.
Our analysis is partial equilibrium in nature, since we eectively treat exchange rate
movements as exogenous. That said, the empirical insights in the paper have implications
for the design of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models that feature endogenously-
determined international portfolios and seek to incorporate the wealth eects of exchange
rate changes that feed back into the economy. Understanding why the exchange rate changes
does not aect the positive aspects of our work - the examination of the wealth eects - but
it does have implications in terms of the optimal composition of international portfolios.3
Our work is related to several previous empirical contributions on international currency
exposures. Along one strand, Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003) compiled data
on the currency composition of the external debts of developing countries, while Goldstein
and Turner (2004) extend their analysis by constructing estimates of net foreign-currency
debt assets. However, these contributions did not take into account the portfolio equity
and FDI components of the international balance sheet. Tille (2003) calculates the foreign
currency composition of the international balance sheet of the United States, while Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2007b) calculate dollar exposures for China, Japan and a set of European
countries. Relative to these contributions, we provide greatly-expanded coverage for a large
number of countries and estimate the full currency composition of the international balance
sheet.
While our work represents a dramatic improvement relative to the status quo, it is im-
3There has been a ﬂurry of recent theoretical work that seeks to calculate optimal international portfolios
within the framework of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium macroeconomic models (including Engel
and Matsumoto 2005, Devereux and Saito 2006, Devereux and Sutherland 2006, Tille and van Wincoop
2007).
2portant to be clear about its limitations. In particular, we have made many assumptions in
constructing our estimated international currency exposures. Moreover, in some cases, we
infer values for missing data by modelling the relation between known country character-
istics and international ﬁnancial holdings. Obviously, estimated data will not be perfectly
accurate, nor will every assumption made ﬁt every country perfectly. We make every eort
to cross-check our data where possible and we detail and defend the choices made in the
appendix describing our data methods.
After describing the conceptual basis of the valuation channel in the next section, Section
3 provides a brief outline of the methods employed to construct the currency position data;
the online appendix provides a detailed description of the methods by which we construct
our data set on currency exposures and a discussion of our key assumptions, the empirical
model that generates values where data are missing and the robustness of these estimates.
We turn in Section 4 to the construction of ﬁnancial exchange rate indices. Section 5 reports
the main results of our empirical analysis. Some conclusions are oered in Section 6.
2 Conceptual Framework
Traditionally, the main focus of attention in analyzing the role of the exchange rate in
the international adjustment process has been its impact on variables such as the trade
balance. However, in recent years, there has been a resurgence in interest in the balance
sheet impact of currency movements. While this valuation channel was recognized in the
portfolio balance literature that developed during the 1970s, the increase in the scale of
gross holding of foreign assets and liabilities means that its quantitative importance has
grown.
At a general level, the role of the valuation channel in the dynamics of the external
position can be expressed using the following accounting framework. The change in the net
foreign asset position between periods w  1 and w can be written as
QIDw  QIDw31 = FDw + YD O w (1)
where FDw is the current account surplus and YD O w is net capital gain on the existing
holdings of foreign assets and liabilities. Although the relation between currency movements
and the current account has been much studied, there is less empirical evidence on the role of
the exchange rate in inﬂuencing net capital gains. To make such calculations, it is necessary
to establish the currency composition of both sides of the international balance sheet. While
the literature cited above has emphasized the split between domestic- and foreign-currency
in the international balance sheet, very little is known in terms of the composition of
the foreign-currency element across the dierent currencies. In particular, Tille (2003)
and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007b) have emphasized that the ‘ﬁnance’ currency weights
for the United States are quite dierent to the ‘trade’ currency weights, with European
currencies much more heavily represented in the former. Accordingly, we seek to gain a
more comprehensive understanding of the distribution of currency exposures for a large set
of countries.
To create these currency composition weights, we combine a number of data sets, aug-
mented by model-generated imputed data. The details of these procedures are reported
3below. Before we address the details, we consider two broad concerns regarding whether
currency weights based on the currency denomination of foreign assets and liabilities accu-
rately represent the currency risk exposure a country faces.
First, local-currency asset prices or the interest/dividend payments on these assets could
be negatively correlated with the exchange rate, such that investor-currency returns might
be insulated from currency movements. To see this, we can also write the change in the
net foreign asset position as
QIDw  QIDw31 = WEw + IFw = WEw + QHWLQYLQFw + YD O PY
w + YD O [U
w (2)
where WEw is the trade balance and IFw is the aggregate net ﬁnancial return on the external
investment position (since, ignoring transfers and cross-border labor income, the current
account is just the sum of the trade balance and net investment income). In turn, the IFw
term is the sum of net investment income (QHWLQYLQFw), the component of net capital
gains that relates to shifts in local-currency asset prices (YD O PY
w ) and the component of
net capital gains that relates to currency movements (YD O [U
w ). Accordingly, an increase
in YD O [U
w may have no impact on the overall net ﬁnancial return, if it is oset by a
decline in local-currency asset prices or a decline in net investment income. Indeed, if
all foreign assets were single-period foreign-currency bonds and all foreign liabilities were
single-period domestic-currency bonds, uncovered interest rate parity would mean that all
predictable movements in exchange rates would be exactly oset by shifts in net investment
income. However, the general failure of uncovered interest parity, plus the fact that most
countries have few domestic-currency foreign debt liabilities, means that this polar case is
not empirically relevant.
More generally, there is a wealth of evidence suggesting that currency movements do
matter for investor-currency returns (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005). For instance, the
failure of uncovered interest parity and success of ﬁnancial trades such as the carry trade
shows that returns do not counter exchange rate movements in bond markets but instead
often reinforce them (Burnside et al 2006). In relation to portfolio equity and FDI posi-
tions, a depreciation of the foreign currency could be accompanied by an improvement in
export performance, boosting the local-currency returns on holdings in export-orientated
ﬁrms. However, in the other direction, a depreciation is also frequently accompanied by a
slowing of the economy, such that local-currency returns on domestically-orientated assets
are negatively aected. These conﬂicting forces may result in a weak average correlation
between currency movements and local-currency returns on portfolio equity and FDI. In
related fashion, Pavlova and Rigobon (2007) show that the co-movement between asset
prices and exchange rates depends on the relative importance of productivity shocks versus
demand shocks: in their model, a positive productivity shock boosts the domestic stock
market and induces exchange rate depreciation, while a positive demand shock also boosts
equity returns but leads to exchange rate appreciation.
Furthermore, bank loans and deposits, reserves, and other assets or liabilities that are
not marked to market do not have price valuation eects, only currency-based valuation
eects, so there is no oset for these asset classes. In summary, while one would expect
exchange rate returns and local-currency asset returns to cancel one another out in some
4ways, in practice there is considerable ‘pass through’ from exchange rate movements to
investor-currency returns. While there is some evidence that exchange rate and equity
returns negatively covary at high frequencies for industrial countries (Hau and Rey 2006),
there is no evidence of this correlation in annual data such that a depreciation of the foreign
currency reduces the home currency value of an equity investment in the foreign country
(Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2005). We return to these issues in the analysis section, where
we ﬁnd that YD O [U is positively correlated with YD Oand has a signiﬁcant impact on the
direction of YD Oas well as on the aggregate net ﬁnancial return on the external investment
position.
Second, if domestic agents hedge all currency exposure by buying insurance from foreign
agents, they will receive osetting gains on their derivative positions against any spot
exchange rate losses. Lack of data means that the extent of cross-border currency hedging
is di!cult to assess; while the volume of currency-related derivative trade is very large,
much of this is between domestic residents, which does not alter the aggregate net exposure
of the economy.45Hau and Rey (2006) estimate that only 10 percent of foreign equity
positions are hedged, often due to institutional restrictions on the use of derivative contracts.
Furthermore, as noted above, if the counterparty in derivative contract is another domestic
resident, the currency risk still resides within the same country. In addition, any hedging
that comes through balancing of assets and liability exposure (e.g. simultaneously holding
dollar assets and liabilities) is captured in our weights: it is only the more complex derivative
contracts that will be missed. Finally, it is not clear that an optimizing agent would hedge
out all currency risk, depending on the correlation of particular currencies with the entire
portfolio of assets and liabilities and consumption growth in the investor’s country (see
Campbell et al 2006 for a discussion).
3D a t a
We follow a two-step procedure in estimating currency positions. First, we determine the
currency composition of assets and liabilities within individual categories, using a variety
of methods and data sources. Second, we weight the categories by their shares in the
international balance sheet in order to construct aggregate currency exposures. Since there
are considerable data gaps for some countries, the construction of currency composition
weights is not entirely mechanical — inference procedures are required to interpolate some
of the missing data. We then rely on recent advances in the modelling of the geographical
distribution of international ﬁnancial portfolios to generate predictions for asset holdings
that allow us to ﬁll in missing observations (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 2008).
Our sample includes 117 countries and we generate estimated currency positions for
the years 1990 to 2004. In constructing ﬁnancially-weighted exchange rate indices, we
eliminate hyperinﬂation episodes due to their status as outliers, and start a country’s data
after the conclusion of a hyperinﬂation (countries with hyperinﬂations late in the sample are
4However, see Becker and Fabbro (2006) for an extensive study of hedging in Australia that shows that
Australia is a net purchaser of currency insurance from foreign investors.
5In some cases, cross-border hedging can exacerbate overall exposures. In particular, suppose that
hedging is mostly carried out by holders of foreign-currency liabilities. For countries such as the United
States that are net long in foreign currencies, this form of hedging raises the aggregate net currency position.
5dropped). Many results examine the change in positions from 1994 to 2004. These results
use a smaller 102 country sample that has full data from 1994 through 2004.6 The online
appendix provides a detailed description of the methods employed to construct estimates
of the currency composition of international balance sheets.
3.1 Foreign Assets
The asset side of a country’s international balance sheet is divided into ﬁve categories:
portfolio equity, direct investment, portfolio debt, other debt (generally bank-related), and
reserves.
Since 2001, the IMF’s Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS) data set an-
nually provides the geographical location of portfolio equity asset holdings for 68 reporter
countries across 220 host countries.7 In order to provide estimates for country pairs that
are missing from the data set, we employ a gravity-based model of bilateral equity hold-
ings to construct estimated positions in these cases.8 We make the key assumption that
equity issued by country m carries exposure to the currency of country m. While there is
no automatic relation between equity returns and currency movements, it is reasonable to
assume that currency-related equity exposures are correlated with the geographical pat-
tern in portfolio equity holdings. (See also the discussion in section 2 regarding the lack
of correlation between returns and exchange rate changes). Accordingly, we generate the
currency composition of equity holdings by combining the actual and synthetic data on the
geography of equity positions together with the currency arrangements for each destination
country. For non-reporter countries, we use synthetic data for their weights. As it turns
out, these do not play a major role in our overall index creation, since countries that are
not CPIS reporters typically hold fairly small equity portfolios.9
For direct investment, we use the UNCTAD database on stocks of bilateral direct in-
vestment assets and liabilities. These data give us both outward and inward stocks of direct
investment for 73 reporting countries vis-a-vis up to 196 partner countries over 1970-2004.
Since we have both inward and outward data, we can infer the bilateral direct investment
assets of many non-reporting countries from the bilateral direct investment liabilities of the
6When a gap in years is present, we average across adjacent years to ﬁll in the missing weights.
7We also make use of the 1997 CPIS trial survey which included a smaller set of reporting countries (27
countries). Since the geographical pattern of portfolio investment is highly persistent, we also use the 1997
weights for the years 1990 through 1996. However, we note that this risks overweighting currencies in the
earlier years that subsequently appreciated, to the extent that portfolio rebalancing across currencies did
not take place.
8See Martin and Rey (2004) and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) for theoretical and empirical support
for such a procedure. Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), we eliminate holdings listed in oshore
ﬁnancial centers. Countries report very large holdings in these oshore centers (such as Luxembourg) but
these holdings really represent claims on assets in other ﬁnal destinations. By excluding these holdings, we
implicitly assume that the holdings in oshore centers eventually wind up in the same pattern as those that
go directly to other countries. After eliminating oshore centers, we are left with 50 reporting countries
and 180 hosts. We follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and primarily use the IMF Background Paper,
“Oshore Financial Centers” (2000), as our guide to labelling countries as oshore centers.
9In fact, the External Wealth of Nations data compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) show that
half of the non-reporters have no equity assets and non-reporters only have an average of 2 to 3 percent of
their foreign assets in equity. For this reason, in an overall index, our derived currency composition of their
equity assets plays a small role.
6reporters. Since most major destinations are reporters, this process gives us a reasonable
gauge of the currency distribution of the non-reporter countries. We follow our process
for portfolio equity and assume that direct investment in country m carries exposure to the
currency of the host country.10
As in the case of portfolio equity, the CPIS dataset provides information on the geo-
graphical patterns in bilateral portfolio bond holdings. We again employ a gravity model
to ﬁll out the geographical information for missing country pairs (where we have the same
number of countries and use the same data as in the equity regressions). However, since
many countries issue foreign-currency debt, estimating the currency composition of foreign
debt assets requires additional steps. We begin with the international securities dataset
maintained by the BIS.11 This dataset contains information on the currency denomination
of international bonds for 113 issuing countries.12 For some countries (such as the United
States), international bonds are issued mainly in domestic currency. For other countries,
international bonds are typically denominated in foreign currency, with the relative impor-
tance of the major international ﬁnancial currencies (dollar, euro, yen, Swiss franc, Sterling)
varying across countries and over time.
Investors from countries whose currencies are popular choices for foreign-currency bond
issues are apt to disproportionately hold their own currencies when purchasing international
debt securities issued by other countries (a tendency seen in the data used from the US
Treasury, Bank of Japan and the European Central Bank). In order to allow for this
currency bias, we follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) in exploiting the data provided
by the United States Treasury, the European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan regarding
the currency composition of the foreign assets of these regions to allocate a higher portion
of major currency denominated debt to investors from each currency’s country.
In relation to other non-portfolio debt assets, we obtained BIS data on the breakdown
between ‘domestic currency’ and ‘foreign currency’ components for the bilateral foreign
assets and liabilities of the banks residents in twenty reporter countries vis-à -vis a large
number of counterpart countries (on a locational basis).13The reporters are the dominant
banking centers and, despite the small number, capture the bulk of world bank holdings.
Finally, the IMF tracks the currency composition of reserves for its member countries, in
its COFER (Currency Composition of O!cial Foreign Exchange Reserves ) database. How-
ever, for conﬁdentiality reasons, the only reported COFER data are for major aggregates
(world, industrial country group, developing country group). However, the country-level
data have been used on a few occasions in research by IMF-a!liated economists to analyze
10The direct investment stocks are valued at book value or historical cost. While it may be preferable to
measure direct investment stocks at market value, this limitation has only limited relevance in establishing
the weights for an FDI exchange rate index, since the geographical composition of the stock is the key factor.
11The construction of this dataset is described in BIS (2003).
12Where the BIS data set lacks data on the currency of issue for a country, we rely on the World Bank’s
GFD database of the currency composition of external debt. This is an imperfect measure because it includes
non portfolio long term debt (such as bank loans), but the countries which are missing BIS data make up a
small fraction of internationally held debt assets. Our dataset focuses on international bond issues - while
foreign investors have become active in the domestic bonds markets of developing countries in very recent
years, the international bond issues are more important for the vast bulk of our sample period.
13Although the foreign assets and liabilities of the banking sector include portfolio items, the currency
composition of the aggregate should be a good proxy for the predominant non-portfolio debt component.
See also BIS (2003, 2006).
7the determinants of cross-country and time series variation in the currency composition of
reserves. We exploit the results from these papers, especially Eichengreen and Mathieson
(2000), to model currency composition. We take the coe!cients from these regressions and
use them to predict the share for each of the major currencies (the dollar, the DM (euro
after 1999), the Swiss Franc, the Yen, and the Pound). Once we have predicted values for
each currency, we impose an adding up constraint and re-normalize the results, so that each
country has totals that add up to 100 percent.
We merge this generated data with actual data on reserves for 2000-2004 for twenty
countries from Truman and Wong (2006) and Wong (2007). For any country for which we
have actual data, we use actual data for those years. Before 2000, we use data from central
banks where available (US, Canada, UK) and blend our model generated data with 2000
actual data. We can further conﬁrm that our predictions are sensible by drawing on two
additional sources of information. First, some countries occasionally report their reserves
shares in announcements or media interviews. Relying on news reports of these currency
shares, we compare predicted with actual (or at least reported, since there is no veriﬁcation)
reserves shares. Our results perform quite well on this measure. Second, Ewe-Hhee Lim
(2006) studies the changing international role of the euro and dollar and gives some regional
information on the currency composition of reserves.
3.2 Foreign Liabilities
The liability side of the international balance sheet is divided into four groups: portfo-
lio equity, direct investment, portfolio debt, and other debt. In many cases, the source
information for portfolio and other debt are combined, so we do not try to disaggregate
them. Consistent with our treatment on the assets side, portfolio equity and direct in-
vestment liabilities are assumed to carry exposure to the domestic currency, such that no
foreign-currency exposure is generated by equity-type liabilities.
All debt liabilities are processed in tandem due to data restrictions. We have data from
the BIS banking statistics database on banking liabilities for 20 countries (and the implied
liabilities to the 20 reporters based on reporters’ assets for the remaining countries). In
addition, we know the currency composition of portfolio debt liabilities, based on issuance
data from the BIS international securities database for 113 reporting countries.
However, neither database includes information on the currency composition of debt
owed to o!cial creditors (bilateral or multilateral o!cial debt), which is a prominent source
of debt for many developing countries. The World Bank’s Global Development Finance
database shows that debt to o!cial creditors ranges from 35 percent to 53 percent of total
developing country debt over the time period 1990-2004. The World Bank does report
the currency composition of aggregate external debt which merges bank, bond and o!cial
debt data. Due to the importance of the o!cial debt composition, we use this World Bank
source for all countries where it is available (it is not available for any industrial country
and is missing for a small number of developing countries).14 For the remaining countries,
we create bond-based weights using the currency composition from BIS issuance data and
weights for other debt from the BIS banking data.
14For the handful of developing countries that show domestic currency international issuance in the BIS
database, we adjust the World Bank currency shares to include the domestic currency issuances.
84 Index Creation
The dataset allows us to build a number of ‘ﬁnancially-weighted’ eective exchange rate
indices for a large number of countries. While the same foreign currencies tend to be
involved in most weights, the crucial result from our work is to identify for each country
the relative shares of domestic and foreign currencies in foreign assets and liabilities and the
relative importance of dierent international currencies in the foreign currency component
of the international balance sheet.
4.1 Asset, Liability, and Trade Indices
Once we have the currency composition data for each asset class within assets and liabilities,
we can combine these asset classes to create aggregate weights, using data from the ‘External
Wealth of Nations’ database constructed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a). This dataset
reports the levels of foreign assets and liabilities for 145 countries over 1970-2004, together
with the composition of each side of the international balance sheet between portfolio equity,
direct investment, reserves and debt. This is important since two countries could have
similar currency exposures within individual asset classes but dierent aggregate exposures,
due to dierences in the relative importance of dierent investment categories across the
two countries. Moreover, the structure of international balance sheets has been shifting over
time: even if currency exposures were stable for individual asset classes, aggregate exposures
could change due to this composition eect. This gives us the currency composition weights
for individual asset classes as well as a set of aggregate weights that would take into account
dierences in the relative importance of the dierent investment categories across countries
and over time. We calculate an aggregate ﬁnance-weighted index as well as asset- and
liability-weighted indices.
















lmw are the weights for currency m in period w in country l’s assets- and liabilities-
exchange rate indices, Dn
lw > On
lw are the relative importance of category n (portfolio equity,
FDI, debt, reserves) in country l’s assets and liabilities in period w and $Dn
lmw>$On
lmw are the
weights for currency m in period w in category n for country l’s assets and liabilities respec-
tively. Accordingly, the aggregate weights are a function of the weights for currency m in
period w for a particular n asset-class of country l’s assets or liabilities, and the weights
across the n asset classes (represented by n
lw).
Our indices use these weights to average the percentage changes of bilateral exchange
rates. Since the currency weights are based on end-of-year data, we use the period w values
to weight the changes in bilateral exchange rates during period w+1. Accordingly, the index






















lw+1 are the asset- and liability-weighted indices for country l, $D
lmw and
$O
lmw are the asset and liability weights attached to currency m in period w and %Hlmw+1
is the percentage change in the end-of-period nominal exchange between l and m during
period w +1 . Trade indices are made in the same manner using weights that add exports
and imports together. Since our currency position data runs from 1990 to 2004, we can use
these weights to create exchange rate indices for 1991 to 2005.
Our index is an approximation of a geometric average that focuses on the percentage
change versus each currency in a given time period as the relevant information, not the
level.15 It will move similarly to a portfolio that uses these weights to deﬁne shares of the
portfolio.16 We deﬁne the exchange rate in the standard manner, the home price of foreign
currency, such that a negative movement represents an appreciation of the home currency.
This assumption means that, if a trading partner experiences a major depreciation due to a
hyperinﬂation or some other crisis, that partner’s exchange rate in the index will decrease
rapidly towards zero — not explode towards inﬁnity. In this way, if the only change in the
various bilateral exchange rates were a collapse of a rate towards zero, our index will simply
drop by the amount of the weight. This is the equivalent of some portion of a portfolio
becoming worthless and thus ﬁts our needs well.17
4.2 Net Indices and Valuation Eects








lw = Dlw@(Dlw + Olw) and vO
lw = Olw@(Dlw + Olw) are the shares of foreign assets and
foreign liabilities in total cross-border holdings. These weights indicate the direction of the
valuation impact of a movement in currency m. If the net foreign asset position is zero, this
reduces to simply subtracting the liability weights from the asset weights. Conceptually,
an index crafted with these weights will capture the directional ee c to fas e to fb i l a t e r a l
exchange rate changes on the net external position.












(The index could equivalently be written in the same form as the asset and liability
15Note that the log of a geometric average is the weight times log(H) for each currency and thus the
approximation of the percentage change of the geometric average would simply be the sum of the change in
log(H), or roughly the percentage change. See Lane and Shambaugh (2007) for more details on the index
method.
16A pure geometric index will not move like a portfolio and thus could not be tracked by a portfolio
assembled using its weights.
17In many settings, when calculating an index and changing the weights over time, one must worry that
a change in the weight with no change in the value of the item in question will lead to a change in the
index. In our case, if the exchange rate for all countries were constant, and the weights change, our index is
unchanged, since the index combines percentage changes in the exchange rate. Accordingly, more complex
chain weighting is not necessary; we can simply employ new weights whenever they are available.
18The index could equivalently be written in the same form as the asset and liability indices using the net
ﬁnancial weights.
10indices using the net ﬁnancial weights deﬁned in equation (5).) This net ﬁnancial exchange
rate index is conceptually dierent from a trade-weighted index since it has currencies
entering both positively and negatively. More importantly, the weights do not need to
add up to one. In the extreme, if net positions and currency compositions are balanced,
there is no movement in the index regardless of bilateral exchange rate movements. Thus,
movements in this index can tell us about the impact of currency movements on the balance
sheet, but it is not a typical exchange rate index.
I nt u r n ,t h i sa l l o w su st ow r i t e
YD O [U
lw+1 =% LI
lw+1  LILlw (7)
where the superscript [U indicates currency-induced valuation changes and the gross scale
of the international balance sheet is measured by LILlw = Dlw+Olw. Equation (7) highlights
that the magnitude of currency-related valuation eects depends on two factors: (i) the
movement in the ﬁnancially-weighted exchange rate index; and (ii) the gross scale of the
international balance sheet.
5A n a l y s i s
The weights and indices described open a variety of avenues for analysis that were previously
unavailable due to a lack of data. Our analysis proceeds along three lines. First, we examine
the various indices described in Section 4. Next, we look at role played by ﬁnancial-weighted
exchange rate indices in driving the valuation component of the dynamics of net foreign
asset positions. Finally, we explore the variation in aggregate foreign currency exposures
across countries and over time.
5.1 Case Studies
It is useful to begin with some case studies. We show a selection of four countries in Figures
1a-1d. The most striking feature of Figure 1a is that the liability index for the United States
is essentially ﬂat, since (as is well established) the foreign-currency component in its external
liabilities is very low. While the asset- and trade-weighted indices are qualitatively similar,
Figure 1a also highlights that the asset-weighted index has depreciated more sharply than
the trade-weighted index since 2001. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of Tille (2003)
and others: the asset index gives a higher weight to European currencies (against which
the dollar has fallen sharply), while the trade index places a substantial weighting on
Asian countries that track the dollar, are important as trading partners but are not major
destinations for US outward investment.
We show the Brazilian indices in Figure 1b as representative of the typical emerging
market economy. While the asset, liability and trade indices show a high degree of co-
movement, the liability index is substantially less volatile (especially in the latter part of
the sample period), which reﬂects the importance of the domestic-currency component in
total liabilities.
China and Benin present interesting contrasts in Figures 1c and 1d of countries that
followed pegged exchange rate regimes during the sample period. The Chinese peg to the
11dollar stabilized its ﬁnancially-weighted indices but its trade index was quite volatile, since
industrial countries that ﬂoat against the dollar are important trading partners for China.
In contrast, the trade index for Benin is much less volatile than its ﬁnancial indices. As a
member of the CFA zone that pegged to the French Franc during the 1990s (with a one-o
step devaluation in 1994) and subsequently to the euro, Benin’s exchange rate has been
relatively stable against its major European and regional trading partners. In contrast,
Benin has signiﬁcant dollar ﬁnancial liabilities and ﬂuctuations in the euro-dollar rate map
into volatile ﬁnancial indices for Benin. Moreover, the sharp ﬂuctuations in the franc/euro
against the dollar has meant that Benin’s trade and ﬁnancial indices have moved in opposite
directions for much of the post-1994 period.
In summary, the message from Figures 1a-1d is that there is a diverse range of patterns
in the behavior of ﬁnancially-weighted exchange rates, with the trade index not generally
informative about the ﬁnancial impact of currency movements.
5.2 Comparison of Exchange Rate Indices
We turn to a quantitative comparison of exchange rate indices in Tables 1 and 2. Tables
1 reports the the mean and median within-country correlation of the annual percentage
changes in dierent indices as well as the mean within quartiles, while Table 2 reports the
second moments. 19 The asset- and liability-indices show a high pairwise correlation. In
addition, both are individually correlated with the trade index, although the correlation is
a bit weaker for the liability index (largely reﬂecting the importance of domestic-currency
liabilities). In relation to the correlations between the ﬁnancial indices and the trade index,
the mean and median correlations are high but there are many cases in which the cor-
relations are much lower. In particular, the mean correlation between the asset-weighted
and trade-weighted indices is only 0.60 for the ﬁrst quartile of countries, while the correla-
tion between the liability-weighted and the trade-weighted indices is only 0.52 for the ﬁrst
quartile.
Table 2 shows that the liability index is much more stable than the asset index, especially
for industrial countries. This again reﬂects the greater share of the domestic currency in
liability indices. The leader in this regard is the United States, where over 90 percent of
liabilities are in dollars and as a result the liability index has a volatility of less than 1
percent a year. Since the liability index is so much more stable than the asset index, even
if the two move directionally together and are highly correlated, the amplitude of the asset
index is greater. In turn, this implies that currency movements may generate valuation
eects, even for countries with zero net foreign asset positions.
We also examine a number of alternatives to the main indices. First, we examine an
asset index that looks only at the debt portion of the balance sheet, and it behaves very
similarly to the general asset index. We also examine only the foreign currency portion of
the external portfolios. While a large domestic currency share of liabilities may stabilize
that index, it is also interesting to see to what extent excluding those liabilities changes the
19This table, and many others, breaks countries into advanced, emerging, and developing groups. The
advanced countries are the group typically known as industrialized countries (ifs code less than 199 except
Turkey). The emerging sample is the group of countries in the Morgan Stanley emerging market index with
some additional eastern European countries. The developing sample is all other countries.
12index. We see from columns (5) of Table 1 that the impact is negligible. The direction of
the index is not altered by including the domestic-currency portions of the balance sheet in
the weights. Likewise, Table 2 shows the exclusion of domestic-currency components leads
to more volatile indices, especially for the liabilities of industrial countries.
5.3 The Net Financial Index
The net ﬁnancial index captures the directional sensitivity of the external balance sheet to
currency movements. While a depreciation of the domestic currency against some currency m
should over time improve net exports by raising exports and reducing imports, the valuation
impact depends on whether the country is long or short in currency m and currency m’s
relative importance in the aggregate external portfolio.20 Aggregating across all bilateral
currency movements, a country will enjoy a valuation gain if there is an increase in its
net ﬁnancial index and a valuation loss if the net ﬁnancial index falls. Accordingly, a
country receives a double boost to its external position if it experiences a simultaneous
improvement in its trade-weighted index (where an improvement means a depreciation)
and in its net ﬁnancial index, since both the current account and the valuation term will
improve. In contrast, there will be an ambiguous response of the external position in
the case of a country that sees its trade-weighted index and its net ﬁnancial index move in
opposite directions, since an improvement in the trade balance may be oset by the negative
valuation impact. Accordingly, it is interesting to consider the comovement between these
indices.
Figure 1 shows the cross-country distribution of this correlation. About 63 percent
of countries show a negative correlation, with a cluster of countries concentrated near
minus 1: these countries typically had very large depreciations at some point during the
sample period, while maintaining negative foreign-currency positions. There is considerable
heterogeneity even among the advanced economies (marked by their country abbreviation),
even if most of these countries show a positive correlation. Table 3 shows a strongly
negative average correlation between the net ﬁnancial index and the trade-weighted index
for emerging and developing economies. When compared to the results in Table 2, Table 3
also shows that net ﬁnancial indices are far more stable than any other index for all types of
countries.21 This again represents that the net valuation impact of currency movements is
l i m i t e db yt h eo setting eects on the value of foreign-currency assets and foreign-currency
liabilities. However, especially for developing countries, there is a fair degree of volatility
in this index.22
20Since a depreciation boosts net exports by both increasing exports and reducing imports, it is appro-
priate that the trade-weighted index sums across exports and imports. However, the ﬁnancial impact of
a depreciation is ambiguous since the boost to the domestic-currency value of foreign-currency assets may
be oset by the increase in the domestic-currency value of foreign-currency liabilities. Accordingly, foreign-
currency assets enter positively into the net ﬁnancial index but foreign-currency liabilities enter negatively.
21We can also examine a foreign currency only net index. Just as the percentage change in the net index
shows the change in the external balance sheet, the percentage change in a net foreign currency index would
tell us about the change in the foreign currency portion of the balance sheet. The two will always move
almost perfectly together because all movement comes from the foreign currency portion, but the overall net
index’s movements may be dampened by sizeable portions of domestic currency assets or liabilities. As Table
3 shows, the foreign currency only index is slightly more volatile, but the two are nearly indistinguishable.
22The pattern is the same if one instead examines the average absolute value of the percentage change of
135.4 Valuation Eects
As noted in section 4, the net ﬁnancial index tells us the directional impact of currency
movements on the external position, but to know the total impact on the economy, we
need to combine this information with the scale of the international balance sheet. The
total eect, YD O [U
lw becomes the object of interest. We consider three aspects of this term.
First, the extent to which exchange rate based valuation eects drive the overall valuation
term, the persistence of these terms, and ﬁnally the size.
All three results are shown in Table 4. We report indicators of the impact of the
exchange rate on the overall valuation term. where YD O lw is the aggregate valuation term
deﬁned in equation (1) and YD O [U
lw is the currency valuation term deﬁned in equation (7),
with both scaled by GDP. Since YD O [U
lw and YD O PY
lw are not orthogonal, we cannot do a
pure variance decomposition. Instead, we rely on a series of statistics that demonstrate the
importance of YD O [U
lw for the overall valuation term. On the most basic level, Table 4 shows
that the two are positively correlated: the mean and median within-country correlations
are 0.46 and 0.51 respectively. The advanced sample has a weaker connection, but it is still
positive. When YD O [U
lw moves, YD O lw tends to move in the same direction.
Next we show that YD O [U
lw has su!cient variance to be an important part of YD O lw.
The mean country variance ratio is 0.47. Furthermore, the movements in YD O [U
lw are not
simply oset by changes in YD O PY
lw . There is only a mildly negative correlation between
YD O [U
lw and YD O PY
lw for the advanced countries, while the correlation is close to zero
for the full sample and weakly positive for developing countries. In order to provide an
additional quantitative measure of the comovement between the currency valuation term
and the overall valuation term, Table 4 also reports the  and U2 from a simple regression
of YD O lw on YD O [U
lw . If movements in the net ﬁnancial exchange rate index (interacted
with the gross scale of international ﬁnancial integration) were fully oset by shifts in local-
currency returns, then we would expect  =0 . In contrast, a non-zero value of  indicates
that exchange rate movements exert a valuation impact, whether directly or indirectly
(through simultaneous movements in local-currency returns).
The results show an important role for the currency valuation term in explaining that
the overall valuation eect. For developing or emerging countries, the ‘pass through’ is ap-
proximately one-to-one: a currency related gain of 1 percentage point of GDP (according to
our measure) is associated with a 1 percentage point aggregate net capital gain. Moreover,
the regression has considerable explanatory power for these groups of countries (between
0.2 and 0.6). The pattern is quite dierent for the advanced countries. While the currency
valuation term is signiﬁcant in the pooled sample, the explanatory power of the regression
is much lower at 0=080=14. The estimated ˆ  is also much lower at roughly 0.5, which again
suggests that there is some degree of oset by which capital gains via currency movements
are partially cancelled out by lower foreign-currency returns. The dierences between the
advanced and other country groups are quite intuitive: the larger equity positions of the
former group mean that price valuation shocks play a more important role.
Panel B of the next table shows the size relative to GDP of a number of components.
The ﬁrst two columns demonstrate that these currency-induced wealth eects are non-
trivial. The table shows means and medians across the sample. The 75th percentile of
the index instead of the standard deviation of the changes.
14absolute movements in YD O [U
lw is 3.1 percent of GDP for advanced countries, 3.4 percent
for emerging countries, and 4.9 percent for developing countries. These eects are sizable
enough to dominate current account balances in some years and, depending on the market
capitalization of a country, may rival the wealth eects of stock market booms and busts.23
In addition, since these represent cross-border wealth transfers, these may matter more for
the international transmission mechanism than price shifts that also cause large transfers
across agents within an economy.
Importantly, these wealth shocks are not reversed quickly. Table 4 also shows the
average within country autocorrelation coe!cients for YD O [U
lw and YD O lw are nearly zero.
Individual country coe!cients are noisy, but only a handful have point estimates lower than
-0.2 (suggesting some reversals) for the exchange rate valuation shocks. Thus, the wealth
gains or losses from YD O [U are persistent, reinforcing the potential impact on the real
economy.
As noted in section 2, we may also worry that YD O [U is simply osetting expected
returns and the total ﬁnancial impact on QID (valuation plus investment income) is not
materially aected by YD O [U. Table 5 demonstrates that, while an important theoretical
concern, this is not the empirically relevant scenario. Columns (1) through (5) examine
the extent to which YD O [U contributes to movements in the ﬁnancial component IF that
was deﬁned in equation (2). We see very similar results to those in Table 4. YD O [U has
a signiﬁcant share of the variance of the total ﬁnancial component and YD O [U and IF
have a strongly positive correlation. Finally, bivariate regressions yield similar results to
those in Table 4. This is not to argue that QHWLQYLQF is unimportant in the balance
of payments, since panel B shows its size is not trivial (an average share of GDP of 2-3
percent). Rather, QHWLQYLQF is not particularly variable and its variance explains
little of the overall ﬁnancial components variance. Thus, net investment income cannot be
osetting the swings in YD O [U or YD O . In addition, it has a weakly positive correlation
with YD O [U. Thus, we see that the valuation term is fairly sizeable and, while shifts in
market asset prices explain some of its movements, shifts in currencies explain an important
part of the overall ﬁnancial impact on the QID position.
5.5 Aggregate Foreign-Currency Exposure
It is useful to develop a measure of aggregate foreign-currency exposure, which captures the
sensitivity of a country to a uniform movement of its domestic currency against all foreign








lw is the share of foreign assets denominated in foreign currencies, vD
lw is the share
of foreign assets in the sum of foreign assets and foreign liabilities and $O
lw>v O
lw are deﬁned
analogously. Aggregate foreign currency exposure captures the sensitivity of a country to a
uniform currency movement by which the home currency moves proportionally against all
23World stock market capitalization was roughly 100 percent of world GDP in 2005 (Reuters, 2007). Across
major countries, capitalizations range from 50 to 200 percent of GDP meaning a change of 10 percent in
the stock market would generate wealth shocks in the range of 5 to 20 percent of GDP.
15foreign currencies. In turn, the net impact of a uniform shift in the value of the domestic
currency against all foreign currencies is given by
QHWI[lw = I[DJJ
lw  LILlw (9)
Figure 3 and Table 6 show the cross-sectional distribution of I[DJJ in 1994. We see
that a majority (70 percent) have a net negative position in foreign currencies with an
average weight of -23 percent. Roughly 25 percent have below -50 percent weight, leaving
them with a considerable short position in foreign currencies. On the other hand, industrial
countries are on average close to balance (mean and median weight are between zero and
10 percent) and 60 percent of industrial countries have a positive net weight in foreign
currencies. Emerging countries are on balance negative, but much closer to zero than the
poorer developing countries.
Figure 3 also shows the same distribution but for the year 2004. By the end of 2004,
19 percent more of the sample had taken a positive position against the rest of the world.
The mean and median position have both moved close to zero (-3 percent) and less than 10
percent have positions of -50 percent or worse. The industrial countries still have means and
medians close to positive 10 percent with 86 percent of them having net positive exposure.
Emerging countries are also on average positive by 2004. It should be noted that shifting to
a positive net position does not eliminate exchange rate based valuation eects: it simply
means that the sign will be positive when the country depreciates against the rest of the
world.
To put these ﬁgures in context, a negative foreign-currency exposure of 50 percent
against the rest of the world means that a 10 percent depreciation would generate a valuation
loss of 10 percent times 50 percent times total assets and liabilities divided by GDP (recall
that equation (new number) shows the valuation gain is the percentage change in the index
times the gross scale of international ﬁnancial integration). Thus, a country at the average
gross position of 200 percent of GDP would experience a 10 percent of GDP loss from such
a depreciation. These wealth eects are considerable and demonstrate why the aggregate
foreign-currency position against the rest of the world is an important indicator.24
The middle portion of Table 6 shows the shift in ﬁnancial globalization over the sample
period. In general, the external balance sheet as a share of GDP has gone up 60 percent,
but this growth has not been evenly distributed. The LIL ratio for advanced countries is
up over 200 percent (for EMU countries, even more). The scale of ﬁnancial globalization for
emerging markets has gone up 60 percent, but developing countries have actually receded
from the global ﬁnancial system on average, with a small decline in the size of their external
balance sheets.
24We also note that there can still be considerable exchange rate shocks due to bilateral movements even
if I[
DJJ
lw is zero. All but 10 countries are short some other currency in 2004 and 50 percent have a negative
weight of 11 percent or more against some other currency. The largest net negative position varies, with
half short the dollar and the others roughly evenly split between the euro and yen. All but one country are
long another currency, though the average position is smaller (7 percent weight). The long positions are
spread across the dollar (33 percent), the pound (20 percent), and the euro (28 percent) along with 16 other
currencies which are the largest long position for somewhere between 1 and 3 other countries. The more
minor currencies become important due to a large FDI holding in the country and no o-setting liabilities in
that currency. Thus, even countries with roughly balanced net positions tend to have considerable exposure
to movements across bilateral rates.
16The bottom half of Table 6 puts these two features together to show the values of
QHWI[lw in 1994 and 2004. This helps to demonstrate the scale at which a change
i nt h ee x c h a n g er a t ew o u l da ect the economy. The changes from 1994 to 2004 show a
similar pattern to the raw I[DJJ
lw statistics in the top half of the table with the exception
that the industrial countries positions has increased even more by this measure. While
many industrial countries have not shifted I[DJJ
lw dramatically, their scale of ﬁnancial
globalization (LIL) has increased considerably, so their overall net long exposure against
foreign currencies has increased as a share of the economy. Again, they do not risk negative
wealth eects following depreciation, but they are exposed to exchange rate movements.
During the recent appreciation of the euro against the dollar, euro area countries long the
dollar have faced steep losses.
Next, we provide a decomposition of the shifts in currency exposures over the 1994-
2004 period. The shift in foreign-currency exposure between periods wQ and w can come
either from changing the share of assets relative to liabilities in LIL (vD
lw), or changing the
foreign currency weight of liabilities ($O
lmw)o ra s s e t s( $D
lmw). Table 7 shows the driving factors
underlying the changes in I[DJJ
lw . 25 There is a considerable range of behavior of I[DJJ
lw
over the decade. To understand why positions have changed we can divide the sample
into quartiles by the extent that I[DJJ
lw has changed (Panel A of Table 7). While the
lowest quartile sees a small decline in I[DJJ
lw , the top quartile has increased on average
47 percentage points in the measure.
We see that all parts of the decomposition are important in explaining the shift in
positions. The top quartile saw a large positive shift in net foreign asset positions (the
asset share of gross assets and liabilities has increased strongly, 15 percentage points), as
opposed to a decrease for the low quartile. In addition, the top quartile drastically reduced
the foreign currency share of their liabilities (29 percentage points) without a shift in the
share of assets. The bottom quartile showed a considerable drop in the share of both assets
and liabilities. Most countries see no change in ($D
lmw) as nearly all foreign assets are in
foreign currency for most countries.
The drop in the foreign currency component of assets simultaneously with liabilities
is largely an EMU phenomenon. We can see this better by examining the decomposition
across country types in the bottom part of Table 7. EMU countries drastically increased
the importance of domestic currency on both sides of the international balance sheet, with
the foreign-currency shares of assets and liabilities decreasing by 52 and 41 percentage
points respectively. Combined with an essentially average QIDposition, we see why EMU
countries did not see much improvement in their aggregate foreign currency exposure.26
Columns (5)-(8) show more details of the sources of the change in the foreign-currency
exposure. We focus on why the share of assets in the international ﬁnancial integration index
rose and why the foreign currency share of liabilities fell. FDI and equity are denominated
25See Lane and Shambaugh (2008) on the determinants of aggregate foreign-currency exposures.
26The crucial dierence within the EMU countries seems to be the share of foreign currency liabilities
at the start. They all reduce their foreign currency liabilities weight to 10-20 percent. Countries such
as Finland that were near 90 percent to start, therefore see much bigger changes in the foreign currency
liabilities. Also, countries that started with more liabilities tend to see better improvement because even if
they reduced the foreign currency share of assets and liabilities simultaneously, the impact of the liabilities
is bigger.
17in local currency, so increasing their share of liabilities will lower the foreign currency
component of liabilities. Panel A shows that the top two quartiles (the ones that improved
I[DJJ
lw the most) saw substantial shifts towards equity oriented ﬁnancing, while Panel
B demonstrates that this shift is found most strongly in the emerging and developing
countries. On the other hand, there is eectively no change in the foreign-currency share
of debt liabilities beyond the EMU countries, and these changes are trivial for the top two
quartiles.
As for the improved net foreign asset position of many countries, we examine whether
this is purely a result of increases in the accumulation of reserves. We see that for all
quartiles increases in reserves contributed to the increase in total assets. For the top
quartile, over 50 percent of the increase in total assets came from an increase in reserves,
while only the top quartile saw a substantial increase in the non-reserve net foreign asset
position. Across country groups, we see that only the non-advanced countries were truly
stockpiling reserves and that, for emerging countries, it was this behavior that drove the
shift in vD
lw as the non-reserve net external position was actually negative on average. Thus,
the shift away from negative foreign currency positions is not coming from borrowing in
domestic currency but from the shift towards equity ﬁnance and improvements in the net
foreign asset position.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
Our goal in this paper has been to understand the international ﬁnancial implications of
currency movements. To this end, we have drawn from a wide range of sources to build
a large-scale data set of international currency positions, constructed ﬁnancially-weighted
exchange rate indices and calculated net foreign-currency exposures.
Our analysis shows that trade-weighted exchange rate indices are an inadequate guide
in understanding the wealth eects of currency movements. In addition, we ﬁnd that many
developing countries have historically had a negative net position in foreign currencies,
such that depreciations of the domestic currency have generated negative wealth eects.
However, we have found that many of these countries have shifted towards a less exposed
currency position over the last decade, largely through improvements in their net foreign
asset position and an increase in the share of foreign liabilities that are in domestic-currency
categories (such as portfolio equity and FDI). In addition, many countries (especially the
advanced economies) have increased gross international positions so much that, even with
relatively balanced net positions, they still may experience substantial wealth shocks from
currency movements.
Finally, we ﬁnd that the wealth eects associated with exchange rate changes are sub-
stantial, unlikely to reverse quickly, and can explain a sizable share of the overall valuation
shocks that hit the net foreign asset position, especially for developing countries. We view
these results as providing an important guide for the appropriate design of the next gen-
eration of ‘new portfolio balance’ models of the open economy. Our ﬁndings highlight the
importance of modelling the dual role of exchange rates in the international adjustment
process: the ﬁnancially-weighted exchange rate index operates through the valuation chan-
nel, while the trade-weighted index inﬂuences net exports. Accordingly, the inclusion of
18the valuation channel in our models may enhance our understanding of domestic macroeco-
nomic performance and the optimal design of macroeconomic policies for open economies.
Data Appendix
Estimating Currency Positions: Methods
As noted in section 3, we follow a two-step procedure in estimating currency positions.
First, we determine the currency composition of assets and liabilities within individual
asset classes. Second, we weight the asset classes by their shares in the country’s portfolio
in order to construct the aggregate index. This appendix provides a detailed description of
how we construct the estimated currency positions.
Foreign Assets
The asset side of a country’s international balance sheet is divided into ﬁve classes: portfolio
equity, direct investment, portfolio debt, other debt (generally bank-related), and reserves.
Each requires its own sources and unique methodology and these methods are described
below.
Portfolio Equity
The CPIS data set provides the geographical location of equity asset holdings by country
for 68 reporter countries across 220 host countries. In order to provide estimates for country
pairs that are missing from the data set, we employ a gravity-based model of bilateral equity
holdings to construct estimated positions in these cases.27
Our approach relies on two key assumptions. First, we assume that equity issued by
a country is denominated in the currency of that country. That is, US stocks are de-
nominated in dollars, Japanese stocks in yen and so on. While there is no automatic
relation between equity returns and currency movements, it is reasonable to assume that
currency-related equity exposures are correlated with the geographical pattern in portfolio
and direct investment equity holdings. In particular, especially for smaller source coun-
tries, the domestic-currency spot value of a foreign equity should move one for one with
the relevant bilateral exchange rate if the foreign-currency equity value moves orthogonally
to the bilateral exchange rate.28 (See also the discussion in section 2 regarding the lack of
correlation between returns and exchange rate changes).
27See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), Portes and Rey (2005) and Martin and Rey (2004) for theoretical
and empirical support for such a procedure. We do not rely on trade ﬂows, but instead are essentially
creating an asset allocation model where host GDP proxies for investment opportunities, and distance and
other gravity variables proxy for information costs.
28This also applies if foreign equity is held in the form of an American or global depository receipt . (In
measuring the international investment position, the domestic versus foreign status of an asset depends on
the residence of the issuer, not on the location of the transaction.) Consider a US investor holding stock
in a Chilean ﬁrm through an ADR listed in New York. Since these stocks are listed primarily in Chile, the
dollar price in New York automatically moves with the peso-dollar exchange rate and the peso value of the
stock in Chile.
19Second, following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008), we eliminate holdings listed in o-
shore ﬁnancial centers. Countries report very large holdings in these oshore centers (such
as Luxembourg) but these holdings really represent claims on assets in other ﬁnal desti-
nations. By excluding these holdings, we implicitly assume that the holdings in oshore
centers eventually wind up in the same pattern as those that go directly to other countries.
After eliminating oshore centers, we are left with 50 reporting countries and 180 hosts.29
In order to generate estimated positions for those country pairs that are missing from
the CPIS dataset, we employ a modiﬁed-form of the speciﬁcation developed by Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2008) by running a bilateral equity holding regression of the form
log(1 + HTlmw)=!m + w + ]lmw + [lw + %lmw (10)
where !m r e p r e s e n th o s tc o u n t r yﬁ x e de ects, w year ﬁxed eects and ]lmw is a vector of
bilateral variables - distance, longitude gap (to proxy for time zone dierences), common
language dummies, colonial relationship dummies, and measures of relative GDP such as
a dummy for both countries being industrial, the gap in GDP per capita and the gap in
GDP.
We do not include source country ﬁxed eects, since our goal is to estimate missing
source country data, but we can include a number of source country characteristics in [lw
such as latitude, landlocked status, population, capital controls, and GDP per capita.30
Such time invariant (or nearly time invariant) data cannot be included for the host country
as the host country ﬁxed eect already controls for all host characteristics.31 This regres-
sion has considerable explanatory power (U2 values in the region of 0.79), high enough to
generate sensible predicted values, and the coe!cients on the independent variables take
expected signs and magnitudes.32
We then use these predicted values for the missing observations, along with the actual
data, to generate currency composition of equity holdings. For non-reporter countries, we
are using synthetic data for their weights. As it turns out, these do not play as dramatic role
as one might fear in our overall index creation, since countries that are not CPIS reporters
typically hold fairly small equity portfolios. In fact, the External Wealth of Nations data
compiled by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007a) show that half of the non-reporters have no
equity assets and non-reporters only have an average of 2 to 3 percent of their foreign assets
in equity. For this reason, in an overall index, our derived currency composition of their
equity assets plays a small role.
29We follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) and primarily use the IMF Background Paper, “Oshore
Financial Centers” (2000), as our guide to labelling countries as oshore centers.
30Geography and other gravity model controls come from the CEPII geography database. GDP data is
from the World Bank WDI database.
31While Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2008) show that the level of trade is a predictor for equity positions,
once a su!cient number of gravity controls are included, we ﬁnd that despite trade receiving a signiﬁcant
coe!cient, the U
2 on the overall regression does not move much when including trade. Since there are many
missing observations for the trade data, we do not include it.
32Details of these results are available from the authors upon request.
20Direct Investment
We use the UNCTAD database on stocks of bilateral direct investment assets and liabilities.
These data give us both outward and inward stocks of direct investment for 73 reporting
countries vis-a-vis up to 196 partner countries. Since we have both inward and outward data,
we can infer the bilateral direct investment assets of many non-reporting countries from
the bilateral direct investment liabilities of the reporters. Since most major destinations
are reporters, this process gives us a reasonable gauge of the currency distribution of the
non-reporter countries.
The data are available over 1970-2004, although there are many missing observations.
The direct investment stocks are valued at book value or historical cost. While it may
be preferable to measure direct investment stocks at market value, this limitation has
only limited relevance in establishing the weights for an FDI exchange rate index, since
the geographical composition of the stock is the key factor. Since we have both inward
and outward data, we can use this to establish bilateral patterns for a large number of
countries.33
We follow our process for portfolio equity and assume that all direct investment is ef-
fectively denominated in the currency of the host country. This is plausible to the extent
that direct investment assets have a location-speciﬁc component (e.g. structures or in-
stalled equipment) and/or proﬁts are largely generated in the host country. However, it is
more problematic in the case of export-platform FDI: while domestic costs still matter for
proﬁtability and the value of the FDI position, it also depends on revenues generated in
ﬁnal customer markets. In addition, the FDI data include both equity and intra-company
loans, with the latter plausibly more likely to be denominated in the currency of the source
country. While we bear these caveats in mind, we proceed with the assumption that the
value of direct investment positions are denominated in the currency of the host country.
Portfolio Debt
In some cases, as is detailed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c), countries report the
currency composition of their foreign portfolio debt asset portfolios. This information is
reported for the United States in the Report on the US Portfolio Holdings of Foreign
Securities published by the US Treasury, while the Bank of Japan has released the currency
composition of Japanese portfolio debt assets at the end of 2005 in its Portfolio Investment
Position Report.
However, for most countries, we do not have direct information on the currency com-
position of foreign portfolio debt assets. Accordingly, we adopt a multi-step inference
procedure. As in the case of portfolio equity, the CPIS dataset provides information on
the geographical patterns in bilateral portfolio bond holdings. We again employ a gravity
model to ﬁll out the geographical information for missing country pairs (where we have the
same number of countries and use the same data as in the equity regressions). For these
33For a small number of countries we rely on ﬂow data to create a general pattern because the stock data
is too incomplete. Also, for a handful of countries where FDI is not signiﬁcant (less than 1 percent of total
assets and less than 40 million dollars) and the data appear incomplete, we drop FDI from total assets and
rescale remaining assets.
21regressions, the U2 is approximately 0.77 and again the signs on the coe!cients on the
independent variables are sensible.
However, since many countries issue foreign-currency debt, estimating the currency com-
position of foreign debt assets requires additional steps. We begin with the international
securities dataset maintained by the BIS. 34 This dataset contains information on the cur-
rency denomination of international bonds for 113 issuing countries.35 For some countries
(such as the United States), international bonds are issued mainly in domestic currency.
For other countries, international bonds are typically denominated in foreign currency, with
the relative importance of the major international ﬁnancial currencies (dollar, euro, yen,
Swiss franc, Sterling) varying across countries and over time.
In order to estimate the currency composition of portfolio debt assets, a na ïve approach
would be to simply assume that if a country holds an amount issued by country A, then the
currency composition of those holdings reﬂects the aggregate currency composition of the
international debt issued by country A. However, this would be misleading, since investors
from countries whose currencies are popular choices for foreign-currency bond issues are
apt to disproportionately hold their own currencies when purchasing international debt
securities issued by other countries (a tendency seen in the data used below from the US
T r e a s u r y ,B a n ko fJ a p a n ,a n dE C B ) .
In order to allow for this currency bias, we follow Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c) in
exploiting the data provided by the United States Treasury, the European Central Bank
and the Bank of Japan regarding the currency composition of the foreign assets of these
regions. The United States reports the currency denomination of its portfolio debt assets in
each destination country (US Treasury 2004). From the Bank of Japan data, it is clear that
Japanese investors purchase (virtually) all of the yen-denominated debt issued by other
countries, while the European Central Bank data suggests that investors from the euro
area hold 66 percent of the euro-denominated debt issued by other countries (European
Central Bank 2005).36 Accordingly, we adjust the currency weights derived from the BIS
data to take into account the portfolio choices by the investors from the major currency
blocs and employ these adjusted weights in working out the currency composition of the
foreign holdings of investors from other countries.37
In particular, our re-weighting procedure is as follows. For each issuing country, the US
Treasury reports the currency composition of portfolio debt holdings in each country, so we
are able to directly subtract the exact US holdings from BIS issuance data to generate new
“rest of the world” totals for the currency composition of the international bonds issued
34The construction of this dataset is described in BIS (2003).
35Where the BIS data set lacks data on the currency of issue for a country, we rely on the World Bank’s
GFD database of the currency composition of external debt. This is an imperfect measure because it includes
non portfolio long term debt (such as bank loans), but the countries which are missing BIS data make up a
small fraction of internationally held debt assets. Our dataset focuses on international bond issues - while
foreign investors have become active in the domestic bonds markets of developing countries in very recent
years, the international bond issues are more important for the vast bulk of our sample period.
36Bank of Japan data show the currency composition and amount of Japanese foreign long-term debt
assets. When compared with the BIS currency denomination issuance data set, we see that eectively all
yen-denominated debt issued outside Japan is held by Japanese investors.
37That is, if US, European, and Japanese investors all hold debt in Brazil and Brazil issues debt in local
currency, dollars, euro, and yen, then the US investor most likely holds dollar debt, the Japanese investor
most likely holds more yen debt and the European investor most likely holds more euro debt.
22by each country that are not held by US investors. Since the information from the Bank
of Japan shows that Japanese investors hold nearly all the yen debt that is issued outside
Japan, yen shares for issuing countries other than Japan are set to zero for investors from
outside Japan.38 Finally, the ECB reports that euro area investors hold 66 percent of
euro-denominated debt that is issued by non-EMU countries. In this way, the level of euro-
denominated debt issued by a non-EMU country that is held by investors outside the euro
area is set equal to 34 percent of the total euro denominated debt issued by the country.
Accordingly, these adjusted levels are the basis for calculating the currency composition
of the foreign portfolio debt held by investors from the rest of the world. Then, we can
combine the geographical holdings for a country with the ‘residual’ currency composition
of all of the countries where a country holds debt to generate the currency composition of
its foreign portfolio debt.39
For individual members of the euro area, our procedure is as follows. First, we
sum across the euro area members to get the total holdings of the euro area in each host
country. Consistent with the approach described earlier, we assume that the total holdings
of the euro area in country A is distributed between euro-denominated debt (equal to 66
percent of the total euro-denominated debt issued by country A) and debt denominated in
other currencies. With respect to the latter, the currency denomination is allocated along
the lines of the rest of world data described above (using the non-euro proportions, after
removing US holdings and yen-issued debt outside Japan). At that point, we have the
currency denomination of debt assets held by individual euro area countries across each
host destination. This does not generate the same currency weights for each euro area
member, since each country has a dierent geographical pattern in its portfolio.
Other Debt
From the BIS, we obtained the breakdown between ‘domestic currency’ and ‘foreign cur-
rency’ components for the bilateral foreign assets and liabilities of the banks residents in
twenty reporter countries vis-à -vis a large number of counterpart countries over 1977-2005
(on a locational basis).40414243The reporters are the dominant banking centers and, despite
the small number, capture the bulk of world bank holdings. When looking at the reporters’
assets, 72 to 90 percent of them are in other reporter countries. Furthermore, Turkey, the
38This is not to say that no country holds yen debt except Japan. Simply, most countries hold yen-
denominated securities issued by Japanese entities. When another country issues yen debt, it is typically
bought by Japanese investors.
39That is, for all other investors, we assume a uniform currency distribution in relation to the international
bonds issued by a given host country. In this way, dierences in currency exposures among investor countries
are driven by dispersion in the geographical distribution of their foreign portfolio debt assets: country A
that mostly invests in countries that predominantly issue dollar-denominated bonds faces dierent country
risks compared to country B that mostly targets countries that issue euro-denominated debt.
40Although the foreign assets and liabilities of the banking sector include portfolio items, the currency
composition of the aggregate should be a good proxy for the predominant non-portfolio debt component.
See also BIS (2003, 2006).
41Clearly, our study would be enhanced if we could obtain these data for a larger number of reporting
countries.
42The use of the locational data follows balance of payments accounting principles.
43Following Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007c), some national central banks report the currency composition
of the foreign assets and liabilities of the “monetary and ﬁnancial institutions” sector.
23one reporter most representative of the other non reporters has 90 percent of its assets and
91 percent of its liabilities in other reporter countries. Thus, when we use the liabilities of
the reporters to infer the assets of the non-reporters, we expect to have good coverage.
We begin with the reporter country asset positions. In calculating the currency com-
position of non-portfolio debt assets, the ‘domestic currency’ data are useful, since this
tells us the levels of dollar-denominated foreign assets owned by the US banking system,
yen-denominated foreign assets for Japanese banks and so on.
Regarding the ‘foreign currency’ component, a candidate strategy is to allocate this
across the major currencies, in line with the aggregate currency shares in foreign currency
assets and liabilities that are reported by the BIS. (Of course, our estimates would be
more accurate, if it were possible to directly obtain the detailed currency breakdown of
the ‘foreign currency’ component for individual countries.) Furthermore, for those host
countries that are also reporting countries (where most of the assets lie), we also know
the ‘domestic currency’ versus ‘foreign currency’ split in terms of the foreign liabilities of
its banking system. If we assume that this proportion is representative for the claims of
foreign banks in that country, then we only need to use the ‘world’ averages for the non-
host currency component of the foreign-currency element of the foreign bank claims held by
other reporting countries in that destination. Again, because reporters are the dominant
banking locations, we are only using world averages for a relatively small portion of assets.
We can make inferences about the currency composition of the foreign assets of the
banking systems of non-reporting countries by using the data on currency composition
of the foreign liabilities of the banking systems of the reporting countries. These data
reveal the geographical pattern of the foreign claims of non-reporting countries vis-à-vis
the reporters and the split between the ‘domestic currency’ and the ‘foreign currency’
components for each reporter. Because the reporters are dominant currencies, much of
their banking liabilities (and hence non-reporters assets) are in their own currency and
directly known (for example, 89 percent of the US liabilities are in US dollars). In turn, we
can allocate the ‘foreign currency’ component according to the global distribution reported
by the BIS. Again, although we only have data for twenty reporters, these include all the
major banking centers so that this approach should yield plausible estimates of the currency
composition of the foreign non-portfolio debt assets of the non-reporting countries.
Reserves
The IMF tracks the currency composition of reserves for its member countries, in its COFER
(Currency Composition of O!cial Foreign Exchange Reserves ) database.44 However, for
conﬁdentiality reasons, the only reported COFER data are for major aggregates (world,
industrial country group, developing country group). However, the country-level data have
been used on a few occasions in research by IMF-a!liated economists to analyze the deter-
minants of cross-country and time series variation in the currency composition of reserves.
We exploit the results from these papers to model currency composition.
The major starting point is Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000). In this paper, the
authors run separate regressions by currency to predict the share of reserves held in that
currency. The independent variables are trade shares with major currency countries, share
44The dataset is described at https://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm.
24of debt denominated in these currencies, and exchange rate regime relations with these
countries. 45 A ni m p o r t a n ta s p e c to ft h i sw o r ki st h a ti ti sn o ts i m p l yt h et r a d es h a r e
with the currency in question included in each regression, but trade and debt shares with
the other major currencies are included as well. That way, we can see that having a very
large share of trade with Germany can reduce the share of dollars in reserve holdings, even
controlling for the share of trade with the US. The U2 for these regressions ranges from
0.59 for the US dollar share down to 0.35 for the yen share.
We take the coe!cients from these regressions and use them to predict the share for
each of the major currencies (the dollar, the DM (euro after 1999), the Swiss Franc, the
Yen, and the Pound). Once we have predicted values for each currency, we impose an
adding up constraint and re-normalize the results, so that each country has totals that add
up to 100 percent.
To ensure that the results match information about world totals and can adjust over
time with world trends, we make one more adjustment. The constants reported in the
Eichengreen-Mathieson regressions are time invariant. We assume that these constants
could have been allowed to vary over time and alter them such that world totals for our
predicted reserves holdings match the world averages reported in the COFER database.
That is, we multiply the predicted currency shares by each countries’ total reserves holdings
and sum across the world. This gives us the world shares. We subsequently adjust the
constants such that the predicted shares change until the predicted world averages match
the actual world averages. This lets us take into account world trends in reserves holdings
over time. 46
We merge this generated data with actual data on reserves for 2000-2004 for twenty
countries from Truman and Wong (2006) and Wong (2007). For any country for which we
have actual data, we use actual data for those years. Before 2000, we use data from central
banks where available (US, Canada, UK) and blend our model generated data with 2000
actual data where in 1999 we weigh the actual data .9 and the model data .1, for 1998 it
is .8, .2, etc. In practice our estimates were close tot he 2000-4 actual data, so a variety
of blending techniques yielded nearly identical results and our model generated estimates
for 2000-4 were quite similar to the actual numbers for most of the twenty countries in
question.
We can further conﬁrm that our predictions are sensible by drawing on two additional
sources of information. First, some countries occasionally report their reserves shares in
announcements or media interviews. Relying on news reports of these currency shares, we
compare predicted with actual (or at least reported, since there is no veriﬁcation) reserves
45We use trade data from the IMF DOTS database and exchange rate regime data from Shambaugh (2004).
We use debt denomination data from the World Bank GFD database, augmenting with BIS issuance data
where necessary. We use the World Bank data as a starting point to be consistent with Eichengreen and
Mthieson.
46To make the adjustment, we increase (decrease) the constants used to make the predicted values for each
currency by the amount that currency is under (over) predicted when compared to world averages. Then
the new predicted values are calculated and the predicted world averages recalculated and again compared
to the actual world averages. The iterations are continued until there is a near perfect match between
predicted and actual world holdings by currency. The constants that would generate predictions that match
the world average are not in fact uniquely determined, but this process brings us to a set of constants as
close as possible to the time invariant ones reported in the empirical work, and small dierences in the
constants make virtually no dierence to the ﬁnal results.
25shares. Our results seem to perform quite well on this measure. Countries like Sweden
that report roughly equal dollar and euro reserves show 40 percent dollar and 50 percent
euro reserves in our calculations. China, who is reported to hold roughly 70 percent dollar,
20 percent euro and 10 percent other currencies, is found to hold 70-75 percent dollar,
approximately 15 percent euro, and 10-15 percent other in our calculations (over various
recent years). In general, non-EMU European countries tend to hold 40-50 percent each in
dollars and euro in our work; Latin American countries tend to hold mostly dollars, Asian
countries hold largely dollars with some yen and euro as well, and all these ﬁgures seem to
mesh reasonably well with the scattered media reports on the subject.
Second, Ewe-Hhee Lim (2006) studies the changing international role of the euro and
dollar and gives some regional information on the currency composition of reserves. Again,
due to conﬁdentiality, the results are deliberately reported in a way to make it di!cult to
back out actual currency composition, but we can use these results as a broad check. Lim
breaks countries into two groups that we can try to replicate: a dollar-oriented group of
Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and other dollar pegs; as well as a Euro-oriented bloc of
countries neighboring the euro area plus much of Africa. We aggregate our synthetic country
level reserve shares into the same groups. Because the exact members of each group are not
reported, we cannot precisely compare our results, and thus we cannot expect to exactly
match his output, but these results provide a useful benchmark. Looking at the most recent
data for 2004, world average shares were 67 percent US dollar and 25 percent euro. Lim
shows the dollar bloc holding 76 percent dollar and 19 percent euro while we ﬁnd 71 percent
dollar and 21 percent euro. The euro bloc holds 33 percent dollar and 57 percent euro in
his grouping while we ﬁnd 46 percent dollar and 50 percent euro. We see that our work
moves countries towards their actual data from the starting point of the world averages in
both cases. As with the media reports, we do not have perfect matches, but we have a
reasonable agreement between our data and our available cross-checks.
Foreign Liabilities
The liability side of the international balance sheet is divided into four groups: portfo-
lio equity, direct investment, portfolio debt, and other debt. In many cases, the source
information for portfolio and other debt are combined, so we do not try to disaggregate
them.
Portfolio Equity
Consistent with our treatment on the assets side, portfolio equity liabilities are assumed
to be denominated in the currency of the host country. Thus, there is no foreign-currency
exposure from equity liabilities. The size of these liabilities is important in creating total
liability weights, since the larger is the relative share of portfolio equity or FDI liabilities, the
greater the local currency share in liabilities. Thus we only need the size of the liabilities, not
geography or currency denomination. We return to the way dierent asset class categories
are combined below.
26Direct Investment
Direct investment liabilities are assumed to be denominated in the currency of the host
country.47
Portfolio and Other Debt
All debt liabilities are processed in tandem due to data restrictions. We have data from
the BIS banking statistics database on banking liabilities for 20 countries (and the implied
liabilities to the 20 reporters based on reporters’ assets for the remaining countries). In
addition, we know the currency composition of portfolio debt liabilities, based on issuance
data from the BIS international securities database for 113 reporting countries.
However, neither database includes information on the currency composition of debt
owed to o!cial creditors (bilateral or multilateral o!cial debt), which is a prominent source
of debt for many developing countries. The World Bank’s Global Development Finance
database shows that debt to o!cial creditors ranges from 35 percent to 53 percent of total
developing country debt over the time period 1990-2004. The World Bank does report
the currency composition of aggregate external debt which merges bank, bond and o!cial
debt data. Due to the importance of the o!cial debt composition, we use this World Bank
source for all countries where it is available (it is not available for any industrial country
and is missing for a small number of developing countries).48
For the remaining countries, we create bond-based weights using the currency com-
position from BIS issuance data and weights for other debt from the BIS banking data.
These two weights are merged together to create total debt currency composition weights.
The bond based weights are simply a reﬂection of the currency shares of debt issued by
the country. The banking shares follow a similar procedure as other debt assets. For the
twenty reporting countries, we know location of all bank liabilities and can use the break-
down of domestic versus foreign currency to determine the extent to which liabilities are
in the home currency. Then for locations that are also reporters, we can derive from that
country’s assets how much is in that country’s currency (it is reported as domestic currency
in the reporter’s assets). For the remainder, we allocate based on world totals. For the few
countries that are neither reporters nor have data in the World Bank database, we rely on
the assets of the reporters to determine location and currency of their liabilities. Again,
the reporters are involved in one side or the other of the bulk of banking transactions and
we thus have fairly good coverage. See the discussion of other debt assets for details.
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29Table 1: Correlations of Exchange Rate Indices
Quartile (D>O)( D>W)( O>W)( D>DG)( O>OIF)
1 Mean 0.85 0.60 0.52 0.98 0.95
2 Mean 0.97 0.88 0.83 1.00 0.99
3 Mean 0.99 0.96 0.94 1.00 1.00
4 Mean 1.00 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00
All Mean 0.95 0.86 0.82 0.99 0.99
Median 0.98 0.92 0.90 1.00 1.00
Advanced Mean 0.97 0.90 0.85 0.99 0.95
Median 0.98 0.91 0.84 0.99 0.95
Emerging Mean 0.93 0.89 0.86 0.99 0.99
Median 0.98 0.97 0.94 1.00 1.00
Developing Mean 0.96 0.83 0.79 1.00 0.99
Median 0.99 0.92 0.91 1.00 1.00
Means and medians of within country correlations between the percentage change in ex-
change rate indices, annual data over 1991-2005. Full sample of countries. D>O>W denote
asset-, liability- and trade-weighted indices; DG is the debt-only asset-weighted index, while
OIF is the liability index based only on the foreign-currency component.
30Table 2: Volatility of Exchange Rate Indices
DOWD G OIF
All Mean (s.d.) 0.173 0.132 0.152 0.175 0.181
Median (s.d.) 0.102 0.076 0.091 0.105 0.121
Advanced Mean (s.d.) 0.065 0.044 0.055 0.066 0.089
Median (s.d.) 0.064 0.039 0.056 0.069 0.087
Emerging Mean (s.d.) 0.182 0.133 0.167 0.186 0.189
Median (s.d.) 0.132 0.082 0.115 0.134 0.136
Developing Mean (s.d.) 0.206 0.162 0.179 0.207 0.209
Median (s.d.) 0.152 0.115 0.128 0.152 0.154
Means and medians of within country standard deviation of annual changes in exchange
rate indices over 1991-2005, full sample of countries. D>O>W denote asset-, liability- and
trade-weighted indices; DG is the debt-only asset-weighted index, while OIF is the liability
index based only on the foreign-currency component.
31Table 3: Properties of Net Financial Indices
Correlations Volatility
(Q>W)( Q>QIF) v=g=(Q) v=g=(QIF)
All Mean -0.26 0.99 0.067 0.080
Median -0.61 1.00 0.027 0.044
Advanced Mean 0.40 0.97 0.014 0.024
Median 0.73 1.00 0.012 0.023
Emerging Mean -0.14 1.00 0.046 0.055
Median -0.27 1.00 0.030 0.035
Developing Mean -0.54 1.00 0.095 0.110
Median -0.83 1.00 0.067 0.080
Q denotes net ﬁnancial index, W the trade-weighted index and QIF the net index based
on only the foreign-currency components of foreign asset and liability positions. Means and
medians of within country correlations between annual %changes in exchange rate indices
and standard deviations of the annual %changes. Period 1991-2005.
32Table 4: Relation between YD O [U and YD O
YU YD O [U
YD O (>U2) YD O [U
YD O YD O [U
YD O PY YD O YD O [U
All Mean 0.47 (0.78,0.38) 0.46 -0.05 0.03 0.10
Median 0.29 (0.83,0.29) 0.51 -0.09 0.00 0.10
Advanced Mean 0.39 (0.54,0.14) 0.28 -0.24 0.00 0.11
Median 0.24 (0.43,0.08) 0.29 -0.26 -0.08 0.09
Emerging Mean 0.47 (0.64,0.34) 0.42 -0.12 -0.02 0.08
Median 0.32 (0.80,0.18) 0.43 -0.15 0.01 0.05
Developing Mean 0.50 (0.93,0.48) 0.55 0.04 0.06 0.10
Median 0.34 (1.07,0.53) 0.73 0.15 0.00 0.12
Note: YUdenotes variance ratio,  and U2 are statistics from a simple regression of YD O
on a constant andd YD O [U, (>) denotes correlation,  denotes autocorrelation coe!cient.
Statistics are means and medians of within country calculations.
33Table 5: Relation between YD O [U and IF
Panel A
YU YD O [U
IF YU LQF
IF (>U2) YD O [U
IF YD O [U
LQF IF LQF
All Mean 0.46 0.03 (0.88,0.40) 0.47 0.12 -0.08 0.56
Median 0.26 0.02 (0.9,0.29) 0.53 0.15 0.00 0.67
Advanced Mean 0.40 0.03 (0.7,0.18) 0.30 0.12 -0.03 0.67
Median 0.23 0.02 (0.51,0.11) 0.29 0.20 -0.07 0.79
Emerging Mean 0.45 0.04 (0.68,0.34) 0.40 0.12 -0.03 0.61
Median 0.30 0.02 (0.79,0.15) 0.37 0.14 0.00 0.73
Developing Mean 0.49 0.03 (1.04,0.5) 0.57 0.13 -0.11 0.49
Median 0.29 0.01 (1.10,0.55) 0.74 0.12 0.01 0.50
Note: YUdenotes variance ratio,  and U2 are statistics from a simple regression of IF
on a constant andd YD O [U, (>) denotes correlation,  denotes autocorrelation coe!cient.
IF denotes ﬁnancial component of change in net foreign asset position and LQF denotes
net investment income. Statistics are means and medians of within country calculations.
Panel B
YD O YD O [U YD O PY LQF IFR IF
All Mean 8.24 4.71 6.23 3.12 7.19 9.53
Median 3.87 1.53 3.52 2.16 4.38 5.03
Advanced Mean 5.32 2.54 5.28 2.59 6.02 6.18
Median 3.03 1.31 2.55 1.49 3.44 3.65
Emerging Mean 5.69 3.17 4.53 2.45 5.70 7.13
Median 2.80 1.10 2.68 2.12 3.97 4.66
Developing Mean 10.57 6.26 7.40 3.66 8.41 12.08
Median 5.26 2.03 4.47 2.55 5.09 6.43
Note: Size of various components as a share of GDP. IFR= LQF + YD O PY.
34Table 6: Aggregate Foreign Currency Exposure
1994 2004
Mean Median Mean Median
I[DJJ
All -0.23 -0.26 -0.03 -0.03
Advanced 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.09
Emerging -0.09 -0.01 0.06 0.05
Developing -0.41 -0.45 -0.14 -0.22
LIL
All 151.3 112.3 227.9 147.4
Advanced 186.3 145.8 471.0 377.9
Emerging 138.6 79.3 214.6 132.0
Developing 143.3 125.8 132.2 122.1
QHWI[
All -0.27 -0.25 0.11 -0.03
Advanced 0.17 0.08 0.53 0.37
Emerging 0.06 -0.01 0.41 0.04






lw. QHWI[lw = I[DJJ
lw  LILlw. Sample includes the 102
countries with data from 1994 to 2004. Statistics are means and medians of within country
calculations.




lw Uhv QIDsuly (
SHT
Olw GhewOIF
@D@ J G S +IGL
Olw )
1 -0.08 -0.05 -0.15 -0.15 0.37 -0.13 0.07 -0.14
2 0.12 0.04 -0.06 -0.12 0.27 0.11 0.06 -0.08
3 0.25 0.06 0.01 -0.21 0.45 0.07 0.22 -0.01
4 0.47 0.15 -0.02 -0.29 0.54 0.41 0.28 -0.03
All 0.193 0.05 -0.05 -0.20 0.41 0.12 0.16 -0.06
Advanced 0.075 0.04 -0.25 -0.24 0.02 0.05 0.06 -0.27
EMU -0.006 0.01 -0.52 -0.41 -0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.54
Non-EMU 0.156 0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.07 0.10 0.08 -0.01
Emerging 0.150 0.02 -0.0003 -0.19 0.40 -0.07 0.19 -0.01
Developing 0.267 0.07 0.0000 -0.18 0.58 0.25 0.18 0.00
vD
lw represents the change in the share of assets in total IFI, $D
lw shows the change in
the foreign currency share of foreign assets, and $O
lw represents the change in foreign
currency share of liabilities. Uhv@D represents the share of asset growth which comes




represents the change in the portfolio equity and FDI shares of liabilities. GhewOIF
represents the change in the foreign currency share of Debt Liabilities. 1994-2004. Statistics
are means of within country calculations.





























































































































































































































37Figure 2: Distribution of Correlation between Net Financial and Trade-Weighted Ex-




























-1 -0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1

















The following Discussion Papers have been published since 2007: 
Series 1: Economic Studies 
 
 01  2007  The effect of FDI on job separation  Sascha O. Becker 
       Marc-Andreas  Mündler 
 
 02  2007  Threshold dynamics of short-term interest rates:   
      empirical evidence and implications for the  Theofanis Archontakis 
      term structure  Wolfgang Lemke 
 
 03  2007  Price setting in the euro area:   Dias, Dossche, Gautier 
      some stylised facts from individual  Hernando, Sabbatini 
      producer price data  Stahl, Vermeulen 
 
 04  2007  Unemployment and employment protection 
      in a unionized economy with search frictions  Nikolai Stähler 
 
 05  2007  End-user order flow and exchange rate dynamics  S. Reitz, M. A. Schmidt 
       M.  P.  Taylor 
 
 06  2007  Money-based interest rate rules:  C. Gerberding 
      lessons from German data  F. Seitz, A. Worms 
 
 07  2007  Moral hazard and bail-out in fiscal federations:  Kirsten H. Heppke-Falk 
      evidence for the German Länder  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 08  2007  An assessment of the trends in international 
      price competitiveness among EMU countries  Christoph Fischer 
 
 09  2007  Reconsidering the role of monetary indicators 
      for euro area inflation from a Bayesian  Michael Scharnagl 
      perspective using group inclusion probabilities  Christian Schumacher 
 
 10  2007  A note on the coefficient of determination in  Jeong-Ryeol Kurz-Kim 






 11  2007  Exchange rate dynamics in a target zone -  Christian Bauer 
      a heterogeneous expectations approach  Paul De Grauwe, Stefan Reitz 
 
 12  2007  Money and housing -  Claus Greiber 
      evidence for the euro area and the US  Ralph Setzer 
 
 13  2007  An affine macro-finance term structure model 
      for the euro area  Wolfgang Lemke 
 
 14  2007  Does anticipation of government spending matter?  Jörn Tenhofen 
      Evidence from an expectation augmented VAR  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 15  2007  On-the-job search and the cyclical dynamics  Michael Krause 
      of the labor market  Thomas Lubik 
 
 16  2007  Heterogeneous expectations, learning and 
      European inflation dynamics  Anke Weber 
 
 17  2007  Does intra-firm bargaining matter for  Michael Krause 
      business cycle dynamics?  Thomas Lubik 
 
 18  2007  Uncertainty about perceived inflation target  Kosuke Aoki 
      and monetary policy  Takeshi Kimura 
 
 19  2007  The rationality and reliability of expectations 
      reported by British households: micro evidence  James Mitchell 
      from the British household panel survey  Martin Weale 
 
 20  2007  Money in monetary policy design under 
     uncertainty:  the  Two-Pillar  Phillips Curve  Günter W. Beck 
      versus ECB-style cross-checking  Volker Wieland 
 
 21  2007  Corporate marginal tax rate, tax loss carryforwards 
      and investment functions – empirical analysis 





 22  2007  Volatile multinationals? Evidence from the  Claudia M. Buch 
      labor demand of German firms  Alexander Lipponer 
 
 23  2007  International investment positions and  Michael Binder 
      exchange rate dynamics: a dynamic panel analysis  Christian J. Offermanns 
 
 24  2007  Testing for contemporary fiscal policy discretion  Ulf von Kalckreuth 
      with real time data  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 25  2007  Quantifying risk and uncertainty  Malte Knüppel 
      in macroeconomic forecasts  Karl-Heinz Tödter 
 
 26  2007  Taxing deficits to restrain government  
      spending and foster capital accumulation  Nikolai Stähler 
 
 27  2007  Spill-over effects of monetary policy – a progress 
      report on interest rate convergence in Europe  Michael Flad 
 
 28  2007  The timing and magnitude of exchange rate  Hoffmann 
     overshooting  Sondergaard,  Westelius 
 
 29  2007  The timeless perspective vs. discretion: theory and 
      monetary policy implications for an open economy  Alfred V. Guender 
 
 30  2007  International cooperation on innovation: empirical  Pedro Faria 
      evidence for German and Portuguese firms  Tobias Schmidt 
 
 31  2007  Simple interest rate rules with a role for money  M. Scharnagl 
        C. Gerberding, F. Seitz 
 
 32  2007  Does Benford’s law hold in economic Stefan  Günnel 
      research and forecasting?  Karl-Heinz Tödter 
 
 33  2007  The welfare effects of inflation:  Karl-Heinz Tödter 





 34  2007  Factor-MIDAS for now- and forecasting with 
      ragged-edge data: a model comparison for  Massimiliano Marcellino 
     German  GDP  Christian  Schumacher 
 
 35  2007  Monetary policy and core inflation  Michele Lenza 
 
 01  2008  Can capacity constraints explain 
      asymmetries of the business cycle?  Malte Knüppel 
 
 02  2008  Communication, decision-making and the 
      optimal degree of transparency of monetary 
     policy  committees  Anke  Weber 
 
 03  2008  The impact of thin-capitalization rules on  Buettner, Overesch 
      multinationals’ financing and investment decisions Schreiber, Wamser 
 
 04  2008  Comparing the DSGE model with the factor model:  
      an out-of-sample forecasting experiment  Mu-Chun Wang 
 
 05  2008  Financial markets and the current account –  Sabine Herrmann 
      emerging Europe versus emerging Asia  Adalbert Winkler 
 
 06  2008  The German sub-national government bond  Alexander Schulz 
      market: evolution, yields and liquidity  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 07  2008  Integration of financial markets and national  Mathias Hoffmann 
      price levels: the role of exchange rate volatility  Peter Tillmann 
 
 08  2008  Business cycle evidence on firm entry  Vivien Lewis 
 
 09  2008  Panel estimation of state dependent adjustment 
      when the target is unobserved  Ulf von Kalckreuth 
 
 10  2008  Nonlinear oil price dynamics –  Stefan Reitz 





 11  2008  Financing constraints, firm level adjustment 
      of capital and aggregate implications  Ulf von Kalckreuth 
 
 12  2008  Sovereign bond market integration:  Alexander Schulz 
      the euro, trading platforms and globalization  Guntram B. Wolff 
 
 13  2008  Great moderation at the firm level?  Claudia M. Buch 
      Unconditional versus conditional output  Jörg Döpke 
     volatility  Kerstin  Stahn 
 
 14  2008  How informative are macroeconomic 
      risk forecasts? An examination of the   Malte Knüppel 
      Bank of England’s inflation forecasts Guido  Schultefrankenfeld 
 
 15  2008  Foreign (in)direct investment and 
     corporate  taxation  Georg  Wamser 
 
 16  2008  The global dimension of inflation – evidence  Sandra Eickmeier 
      from factor-augmented Phillips curves  Katharina Moll 
 
 17  2008  Global business cycles:  M. Ayhan Kose 
      convergence or decoupling?  Christopher Otrok, Ewar Prasad 
 
 18  2008  Restrictive immigration policy  Gabriel Felbermayr 
      in Germany: pains and gains  Wido Geis 
     foregone?  Wilhelm  Kohler 
 
 19  2008  International portfolios, capital  Nicolas Coeurdacier 
      accumulation and foreign assets  Robert Kollmann 
     dynamics  Philippe  Martin 
 
 20  2008  Financial globalization and  Michael B. Devereux 
      monetary policy  Alan Sutherland 
 
 21  2008  Banking globalization, monetary Nicola  Cetorelli 




 22  2008  Financial exchange rates and international  Philip R. Lane 
      currency exposures  Jay C. Shambaugh  
 
46
Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies 
 
 01  2007  Granularity adjustment for Basel II  Michael B. Gordy 
         Eva  Lütkebohmert 
 
 02  2007  Efficient, profitable and safe banking: 
      an oxymoron? Evidence from a panel  Michael Koetter 
      VAR approach    Daniel Porath 
 
 03  2007  Slippery slopes of stress: ordered failure  Thomas Kick 
      events in German banking    Michael Koetter 
 
 04  2007  Open-end real estate funds in Germany –  C. E. Bannier 
     genesis  and  crisis    F. Fecht, M. Tyrell 
 
 05  2007  Diversification and the banks’ 
      risk-return-characteristics – evidence from  A. Behr, A. Kamp 
      loan portfolios of German banks  C. Memmel, A. Pfingsten 
 
 06  2007  How do banks adjust their capital ratios?  Christoph Memmel 
      Evidence from Germany    Peter Raupach 
 
 07  2007  Modelling dynamic portfolio risk using  Rafael Schmidt 
      risk drivers of elliptical processes  Christian Schmieder 
 
 08  2007  Time-varying contributions by the corporate bond 
      and CDS markets to credit risk price discovery  Niko Dötz 
 
 09  2007  Banking consolidation and small business  K. Marsch, C. Schmieder 
      finance – empirical evidence for Germany  K. Forster-van Aerssen 
 
 10  2007  The quality of banking and regional growth  Hasan, Koetter, Wedow 
 
 11  2007  Welfare effects of financial integration  Fecht, Grüner, Hartmann 
 
 12  2007  The marketability of bank assets and managerial  Falko Fecht 




 13  2007  Asset correlations and credit portfolio risk –  K. Düllmann, M. Scheicher 
      an empirical analysis    C. Schmieder 
 
 14  2007  Relationship lending – empirical evidence  C. Memmel 
      for Germany    C. Schmieder, I. Stein 
 
 15  2007  Creditor concentration: an empirical investigation  S. Ongena, G.Tümer-Alkan 
         N.  von  Westernhagen 
 
 16  2007  Endogenous credit derivatives and bank behaviour  Thilo Pausch 
 
 17  2007  Profitability of Western European banking 
      systems: panel evidence on structural and 
      cyclical determinants    Rainer Beckmann 
 
 18  2007  Estimating probabilities of default with  W. K. Härdle 
      support vector machines    R. A. Moro, D. Schäfer 
 
 01  2008  Analyzing the interest rate risk of banks   
      using time series of accounting-based data:  O. Entrop, C. Memmel 
      evidence from Germany    M. Wilkens, A. Zeisler 
 
 02  2008  Bank mergers and the dynamics of  Ben R. Craig 
      deposit interest rates    Valeriya Dinger 
 
 03  2008  Monetary policy and bank distress:  F. de Graeve 
      an integrated micro-macro approach  T. Kick, M. Koetter 
 
 04  2008  Estimating asset correlations from stock prices  K. Düllmann 
      or default rates – which method is superior?  J. Küll, M. Kunisch 
 
 05  2008  Rollover risk in commercial paper markets 
      and firms’ debt maturity choice  Felix Thierfelder 
 
 06  2008  The success of bank mergers revisited –  Andreas Behr 




 07  2008  Which interest rate scenario is the worst one for 
      a bank? Evidence from a tracking bank approach 
      for German savings and cooperative banks  Christoph Memmel 
 
 08  2008  Market conditions, default risk and  Dragon Yongjun Tang 
      credit spreads    Hong Yan 
 
 09  2008  The pricing of correlated default risk:  Nikola Tarashev 
      evidence from the credit derivatives market  Haibin Zhu 
 
 10  2008  Determinants of European banks’  Christina E. Bannier 
      engagement in loan securitization  Dennis N. Hänsel 
 
 11  2008  Interaction of market and credit risk: an analysis  Klaus Böcker 
      of inter-risk correlation and risk aggregation  Martin Hillebrand 
 
 12  2008  A value at risk analysis of credit default swaps  B. Raunig, M. Scheicher 
 
 13  2008  Systemic bank risk in Brazil: an assessment of 
     correlated  market,  credit, sovereign and inter- 
      bank risk in an environment with stochastic  Theodore M. Barnhill, Jr. 
      volatilities and correlations    Marcos Rietti Souto 
 
 14  2008  Regulatory capital for market and credit risk inter-  T. Breuer, M. Jandačka 
      action: is current regulation always conservative?  K. Rheinberger, M. Summer 
 
 15  2008  The implications of latent technology regimes  Michael Koetter 
      for competition and efficiency in banking  Tigran Poghosyan 
 
 16  2008  The impact of downward rating momentum   André Güttler 
      on credit portfolio risk    Peter Raupach 
 
 17  2008  Stress testing of real credit portfolios  F. Mager, C. Schmieder 
 
 18  2008  Real estate markets and bank distress  M. Koetter, T. Poghosyan  
 
49
Visiting researcher at the Deutsche Bundesbank 
 
 
The Deutsche Bundesbank in Frankfurt is looking for a visiting researcher. Among others 
under certain conditions visiting researchers have access to a wide range of data in the 
Bundesbank. They include micro data on firms and banks not available in the public. 
Visitors should prepare a research project during their stay at the Bundesbank. Candidates 
must hold a PhD and be engaged in the field of either macroeconomics and monetary 
economics, financial markets or international economics. Proposed research projects 
should be from these fields. The visiting term will be from 3 to 6 months. Salary is 
commensurate with experience. 
 
Applicants are requested to send a CV, copies of recent papers, letters of reference and a 
proposal for a research project to: 
 
 
Deutsche Bundesbank 
Personalabteilung 
Wilhelm-Epstein-Str. 14 
 
60431 Frankfurt 
GERMANY 
 